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BLB


BLB operates in the brokerage industry serving retail customers.

It also does arbitrage and commodity trading for its own account and real estate investing through a subsidiary.

The company reported erratic performance over the last five years including net losses that have reduced net worth during market downturns.  It reported net losses on revenues of about 130cr in the last twelve months.  

However, it also reported a net worth of 122cr (at 30th September, 2011) consisting of 80cr of net current assets and just over 20cr of investments, which should have a minimum market value of 5-10cr on quoted companies and mutual funds unless the composition has changed significantly from 31st March, 2011.

The business suffers from various issues such as lack of retail interest in the stock market, severe competition, increased technology outlays, increased regulations and compliance costs, etc.  It is likely to downsize its operations from that existing in the past.

Moreover, its arbitrage operations have been arbitraged away due to increased competition along with computerised trading that has made the market far more efficient than in the past.

Management is currently looking for new business avenues to expand operations.  Its existing operation in commodity derivatives appears to be fraught with material risk of losses.

Its investments through its real estate subsidiaries are not transparent and difficult to analyse. 

Regulatory authorities such as SEBI ought to look into improving disclosures on real estate investments and unquoted investments – specifically disclosing market value or range of fair value – to enable investors to make a judgment on it.  There is a lot of it going around listed companies and the lack of information makes it difficult to make investment judgments about the company.

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