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Inhouse Productions


Inhouse Productions appears to be in the business of producing films/television (tv) programs and providing outsourcing services for the medical industry.

The company reported declining and marginal operating profits on declining revenues in the last five years – reporting 27lacs of operating profits on revenues of about 8cr.  Its debt load appears to be effectively backed by its net current assets.

Although healthcare revenues and profits are substantially higher than the tv segment, curiously enough, management have devoted all their attention to discussing the tv segment and have scarcely mentioned healthcare.

Even more intriguingly, management have not mentioned the name of a single film or tv program in their lengthy discussion of the business and its prospects, casting severe doubt on the legitimacy of the whole operation.

Scanning through the balance sheet, the company has 2cr of investments in miscellaneous unquoted companies in leasing/finance, websites, and entertainment industries.  It also owns 6cr of film inventory – value of which is unknown and 5cr of inter-corporate deposits (no mention of which companies).  It has taken loans from “a” bank, which is strange since bank names are usually mentioned in the accounts.

Management claim to counter the risk of employee attrition with the high quality of its plots and storylines – again, the names of programs containing such fantastic plots remain unmentioned.

Management have also stated their intention to get into the business of trading tv programs and films.  Their particular edge in making this profitable remains unclear although they assert they can do this because of their contacts and track record in the industry, which remains unconvincing.

Overall, the whole operation stinks of fraud and investors would do well to keep away from this stock unless they have reliable information to the contrary.

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